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PARALLEL TEXTS
Il regime greco che prevede un'autorizzazione preliminare per l’acquisizione di diritti di voto in talune società anonime strategiche e un controllo a posteriori è contrario alla libertà di stabilimento
Inglese tratto da:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_CJE-12-141_en.htm
Italiano tratto da:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_CJE-12-141_it.htm
Data documento: 08-11-2012
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The Greek scheme of prior authorisation for the acquisition of voting rights in strategic public limited companies and of ex post control is contrary to the freedom of establishment
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Il regime greco che prevede un'autorizzazione preliminare per l’acquisizione di diritti di voto in talune società anonime strategiche e un controllo a posteriori è contrario alla libertà di stabilimento
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2 |
That scheme confers a discretionary power on the administration which is not easily amenable to judicial review and involves a risk of discrimination
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Tale regime conferisce all’amministrazione un potere discrezionale difficilmente sindacabile in sede giurisdizionale e comporta un rischio di discriminazione
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3 |
Greek legislation requires prior authorisation for the acquisition of voting rights representing 20% or more of the share capital in certain strategic public limited companies which operate national infrastructure networks within a monopoly context.
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La normativa greca assoggetta ad un’autorizzazione preliminare l’acquisizione di diritti di voto che rappresentino oltre il 20% del capitale sociale di talune società anonime strategiche, le quali gestiscono in regime di monopolio determinate reti nazionali di infrastrutture.
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There is provision for ex post control in regard to the adoption of certain decisions.
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È inoltre previsto un controllo a posteriori per l'adozione di talune decisioni.
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5 |
According to the Commission, the Greek scheme applicable to certain strategic companies which are quoted on the stock exchange includes restrictions on the freedom of establishment as well as on the free movement of capital.
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Secondo la Commissione, il regime greco, che si applica a talune società strategiche quotate in Borsa, comporta restrizioni alla libertà di stabilimento nonché alla libera circolazione dei capitali.
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In particular, the ex post control has the effect of restricting the effective participation of shareholders in the management of the undertakings.
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In particolare, il controllo a posteriori produrrebbe l’effetto di ostacolare la partecipazione effettiva degli azionisti alla gestione delle imprese.
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As it takes the view that the Greek legislation must be subject to the fundamental principles of the Treaties, the Commission therefore brought an action against Greece for failure to fulfil obligations.
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Considerando che la normativa greca deve essere assoggettata ai principi fondamentali dei Trattati, la Commissione ha quindi proposto un ricorso per inadempimento nei confronti della Grecia.
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Greece has defended its position by arguing, in particular, that the scheme does not apply to undertakings that have already been privatised and in which the State maintains special privileges (‘golden shares’), but rather to strategic undertakings that have not yet been privatised, and which thus fall outside the scope of the fundamental freedoms.
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La Grecia si è difesa sostenendo, in particolare, che il regime si applicherebbe non alle imprese già privatizzate nell’ambito delle quali lo Stato conservi privilegi speciali («golden shares»), bensì alle imprese strategiche non ancora privatizzate, e si sottrarrebbe, quindi, all’ambito di applicazione delle libertà fondamentali.
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In its judgment delivered today, the Court points out first of all that the Treaty allows the Member States to establish a privatisation scheme in compliance with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.
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Nella sua sentenza odierna, la Corte di giustizia rammenta anzitutto che il Trattato consente agli Stati membri di istituire un regime di privatizzazione, nel rispetto delle libertà fondamentali garantite dallo stesso.
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10 |
In other words, if a State decides to transform public undertakings into public limited companies whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange and may be purchased freely on the market, it cannot subsequently invoke the rule on the protection of private property to remove such acquisitions from the ambit of the fundamental freedoms by making them subject to an authorisation scheme.
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In altri termini, se uno Stato decide di trasformare talune imprese pubbliche in società anonime le cui azioni sono quotate in Borsa e possono essere acquistate liberamente sul mercato, esso non può poi invocare la norma a tutela della proprietà privata per sottrarre siffatte acquisizioni alle libertà fondamentali, subordinandole a un regime di autorizzazione.
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11 |
Next, the Court examines the justification for the restrictions on the freedom of establishment in the light of the objective, invoked by Greece, of ensuring the continuity of basic services and the operation of networks necessary to economic and social life (that is to say, energy and water supply, telecommunications and the management of the country’s two largest ports).
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La Corte esamina poi la giustificazione delle restrizioni alla libertà di stabilimento alla luce dell'obiettivo, invocato dalla Grecia, di garantire la continuità dei servizi di base e il funzionamento delle reti necessarie per la vita economica e sociale (vale a dire l’approvvigionamento di energia e acqua, le telecomunicazioni e la gestione dei due maggiori porti del paese).
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The Court points out that the security of energy supply can only be relied on as a justification if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a fundamental interest of society.
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La Corte rammenta che la sicurezza dell'approvvigionamento di energia può essere invocata come giustificazione solamente in caso di minaccia effettiva e sufficientemente grave ad uno degli interessi fondamentali della collettività.
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The Court then examines whether the Greek legislation is appropriate and proportionate for the purpose of attaining the objectives invoked.
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La Corte accerta se la normativa greca sia adeguata e proporzionata rispetto al conseguimento degli obiettivi invocati.
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14 |
The Court notes in that regard that the prior authorisation scheme produces its effects without a risk, even a potential risk, of interference with the security of supply having been established.
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La Corte constata, a tale proposito, che il regime di autorizzazione preliminare produce i suoi effetti senza che sia accertato un rischio, nemmeno potenziale, per la sicurezza dell’approvvigionamento.
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Moreover, even at the time when the authorisation is granted, it is not certain that all real and sufficiently serious threats to the energy supply can be identified.
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Inoltre, neanche al momento del rilascio dell’autorizzazione è certo che possano essere identificate tutte le ipotesi di minacce effettive e sufficientemente gravi per l’approvvigionamento di energia.
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16 |
The restriction on the exercise of voting rights applies, in addition, not only to decisions capable of threatening the objective of the law in specific respects, but to all those taken by shareholder vote.
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La limitazione dell’esercizio dei diritti di voto si applica, peraltro, non solo alle decisioni atte a mettere specificamente a repentaglio l’obiettivo prefissato dalla legge, bensì a tutte quelle adottate con voto degli azionisti.
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Furthermore, as regards the examination of the proportionality of the national legislation, the Court notes that the criteria making it possible to issue the prior authorisation are listed solely ‘for indicative purposes’ and in general and imprecise terms.
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Inoltre, per quanto riguarda l'analisi della proporzionalità della normativa nazionale, la Corte constata che i criteri per il rilascio dell'autorizzazione preliminare sono menzionati unicamente «a titolo indicativo» e in termini generici e imprecisi.
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They do not make it possible to determine the specific circumstances in which a refusal may be expected.
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Essi non consentono di determinare le circostanze specifiche in presenza delle quali si può prevedere un rifiuto.
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Finally, they do not cover real and sufficiently serious threats and are not of direct relevance to the intended objective.
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Infine, essi non riguardano ipotesi di minacce effettive e sufficientemente gravi e non hanno un rapporto diretto con l’obiettivo perseguito.
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Furthermore, in the case of ex post control of fundamental decisions in the life of an undertaking, the investors are not in a position to know when the right to object may apply, as the circumstances are potentially numerous, undetermined and indeterminable.
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Peraltro, nel caso di un controllo a posteriori delle decisioni fondamentali prese nella vita di un'impresa gli investitori non sono in grado di sapere quando vi può essere un'opposizione, dal momento che le circostanze sono potenzialmente numerose, indeterminate e indeterminabili.
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In conclusion, the Court finds that both the prior authorisation and the ex post control leave the national authorities with a measure of discretion which is too extensive and not easily amendable to judicial review.
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In conclusione, la Corte decide che sia l'autorizzazione preliminare sia il controllo a posteriori lasciano alle autorità nazionali un potere discrezionale troppo ampio, difficilmente sindacabile in sede giurisdizionale.
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Consequently, the restrictions on the freedom of establishment inherent in the Greek scheme of prior authorisation and ex post control are contrary to the freedom of establishment and cannot be justified.
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Di conseguenza, le restrizioni alla libertà di stabilimento inerenti al regime greco di autorizzazione preliminare e di controllo a posteriori sono contrarie alla libertà di stabilimento e non possono essere giustificate.
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NOTE:
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IMPORTANTE:
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An action for failure to fulfil obligations directed against a Member State which has failed to comply with its obligations under European Union law may be brought by the Commission or by another Member State.
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La Commissione o un altro Stato membro possono proporre un ricorso per inadempimento diretto contro uno Stato membro che è venuto meno ai propri obblighi derivanti dal diritto dell’Unione.
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If the Court of Justice finds that there has been a failure to fulfil obligations, the Member State concerned must comply with the Court’s judgment without delay.
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Qualora la Corte di giustizia accerti l’inadempimento, lo Stato membro interessato deve conformarsi alla sentenza senza indugio.
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26 |
Where the Commission considers that the Member State has not complied with the judgment, it may bring a further action seeking financial penalties.
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La Commissione, qualora ritenga che lo Stato membro non si sia conformato alla sentenza, può proporre un altro ricorso chiedendo sanzioni pecuniarie.
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However, if measures transposing a directive have not been notified to the Commission, the Court of Justice can, on a proposal from the Commission, impose penalties at the stage of the initial judgment. |
Tuttavia, in caso di mancata comunicazione delle misure di attuazione di una direttiva alla Commissione, su domanda di quest’ultima, la Corte di giustizia può infliggere sanzioni pecuniarie, al momento della prima sentenza. |
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LISTEN WITH READSPEAKER
The Greek scheme of prior authorisation for the acquisition of voting
rights in strategic public limited companies and of ex post control is contrary
to the freedom of establishment
That scheme confers a discretionary power on the administration
which is not easily amenable to judicial review and involves a risk of
discrimination
Greek legislation requires prior authorisation for the acquisition of
voting rights representing 20% or more of the share capital in certain strategic
public limited companies which operate national infrastructure networks within a
monopoly context.
There is provision for ex post control in regard to the adoption of
certain decisions.
According to the Commission, the Greek scheme applicable to certain
strategic companies which are quoted on the stock exchange includes restrictions
on the freedom of establishment as well as on the free movement of capital.
In particular, the ex post control has the effect of restricting the
effective participation of shareholders in the management of the undertakings.
As it takes the view that the Greek legislation must be subject to the
fundamental principles of the Treaties, the Commission therefore brought an
action against Greece for failure to fulfil obligations.
Greece has defended its position by arguing, in particular, that the
scheme does not apply to undertakings that have already been privatised and in
which the State maintains special privileges (‘golden shares’), but rather to
strategic undertakings that have not yet been privatised, and which thus fall
outside the scope of the fundamental freedoms.
In its judgment delivered today, the Court points out first of all that
the Treaty allows the Member States to establish a privatisation scheme in
compliance with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.
In other words, if a State decides to transform public undertakings
into public limited companies whose shares are quoted on the stock exchange and
may be purchased freely on the market, it cannot subsequently invoke the rule on
the protection of private property to remove such acquisitions from the ambit of
the fundamental freedoms by making them subject to an authorisation scheme.
Next, the Court examines the justification for the restrictions on the
freedom of establishment in the light of the objective, invoked by Greece, of
ensuring the continuity of basic services and the operation of networks
necessary to economic and social life (that is to say, energy and water supply,
telecommunications and the management of the country’s two largest ports).
The Court points out that the security of energy supply can only be
relied on as a justification if there is a genuine and sufficiently serious
threat to a fundamental interest of society.
The Court then examines whether the Greek legislation is appropriate
and proportionate for the purpose of attaining the objectives invoked.
The Court notes in that regard that the prior authorisation scheme
produces its effects without a risk, even a potential risk, of interference with
the security of supply having been established.
Moreover, even at the time when the authorisation is granted, it is not
certain that all real and sufficiently serious threats to the energy supply can
be identified.
The restriction on the exercise of voting rights applies, in addition,
not only to decisions capable of threatening the objective of the law in
specific respects, but to all those taken by shareholder vote.
Furthermore, as regards the examination of the proportionality of the
national legislation, the Court notes that the criteria making it possible to
issue the prior authorisation are listed solely ‘for indicative purposes’ and in
general and imprecise terms.
They do not make it possible to determine the specific circumstances in
which a refusal may be expected.
Finally, they do not cover real and sufficiently serious threats and
are not of direct relevance to the intended objective.
Furthermore, in the case of ex post control of fundamental decisions in
the life of an undertaking, the investors are not in a position to know when the
right to object may apply, as the circumstances are potentially numerous,
undetermined and indeterminable.
In conclusion, the Court finds that both the prior authorisation and
the ex post control leave the national authorities with a measure of discretion
which is too extensive and not easily amendable to judicial review.
Consequently, the restrictions on the freedom of establishment inherent
in the Greek scheme of prior authorisation and ex post control are contrary to
the freedom of establishment and cannot be justified.
NOTE:
An action for failure to fulfil obligations directed against a Member State
which has failed to comply with its obligations under European Union law may be
brought by the Commission or by another Member State.
If the Court of Justice finds that there has been a failure to fulfil
obligations, the Member State concerned must comply with the Court’s judgment
without delay.
Where the Commission considers that the Member State has not complied
with the judgment, it may bring a further action seeking financial penalties.
However, if measures transposing a directive have not been notified to
the Commission, the Court of Justice can, on a proposal from the Commission,
impose penalties at the stage of the initial judgment. |