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WIKIMAG n. 8 - Luglio 2013
Credit rating agency
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A credit rating agency (CRA, also called a
Ratings Service) is a company that assigns
credit ratings — rating of the debtor's ability to pay back
the debt making timely interest payments and the likelihood of
default. An agency may rate the
issuers of
debt
obligations, the debt instruments[1]
and in some cases, the servicers of the underlying debt.[2]
Credit rating agencies are not to be confused with
credit bureaus, aka
consumer credit reporting agencies, which rate individuals
for credit-worthiness, giving them
credit scores.
Debt instruments the agencies rate may include
government bonds,
corporate bonds, CDs (certificates
of deposit),
municipal bonds,
preferred stock, and collateralized securities, such as
mortgage-backed securities and CDOs (collateralized
debt obligations).[3]
The issuers of the obligations/securities
may be companies,
special purpose entities, state and local governments,
non-profit organizations, or sovereign nations.[3]
A credit rating permits (or makes much more easy) the trading of
securities on a
secondary market. A credit rating affects the
interest rate applied to the particular security being
issued, with higher ratings leading to lower interest rates.
The value of such security ratings has been widely
questioned. Before and during the
2007–09 financial crisis tens of thousands of "tranches"
of mortgage-backed
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) in the United States
were issued with the highest rating by the agencies — "triple-A"[4]
— but later write-downs at financial institutions of CDOs
(triple A and lower rated) totaled over $500 billion.[5][6]
Ratings downgrades during the
European sovereign debt crisis of 2010–12 have been blamed
by EU officials for accelerating the crisis.[3]
Credit rating is a highly concentrated industry with the two
largest CRAs —
Moody's Investors Service,
Standard & Poor's — having 80% market share globally, and
the
"Big Three" credit rating agencies — Moody's, S&P and
Fitch Ratings — controlling approximately 95% of the ratings
business.[3]
Other agencies include
DBRS,
A. M. Best (U.S.),
Baycorp Advantage (Australia),
Dun & Bradstreet,
ICRA Limited (India),
Egan-Jones Rating Company (U.S.), Global Credit Ratings Co.
(South
Africa), Levin and Goldstein (Zambia),
Agusto & Co. (Nigeria),
Japan Credit Rating Agency, Ltd. (Japan).,[7]
Muros Ratings[8]
(Russia
alternative
rating agency),
Rapid Ratings International (U.S.),
Credit Rating Information and Services Limited[9][10](Bangladesh)
and
Public Sector Credit Solutions (U.S.).
Ratings
Below are the
credit worthiness grades used by the four largest agencies
for long and short term debt issues. Higher grades are intended
to represent a lower probability of default. For example one
study[11][12]
reportedly shows that over a "5-year time horizon" for bonds
rated by Moody's, "the Aaa cumulative default rate was 0.18%,
the Aa2 0.28%, rising to 2.11% for Baa2, 8.82% for Ba2 and
31.24% for B2. The order is by and large, but not exactly,
preserved over longer time horizons."[13]
Moody's |
S&P |
Fitch |
DBRS |
|
Long-term |
Short-term |
Long-term |
Short-term |
Long-term |
Short-term |
Long-term |
Short-term |
|
Aaa |
P-1 |
AAA |
A-1+ |
AAA |
F1+ |
AAA |
R-1H |
Prime |
Aa1 |
AA+ |
AA+ |
AA(high) |
High grade |
Aa2 |
AA |
AA |
AA |
R-1M |
Aa3 |
AA- |
AA- |
AA(low) |
A1 |
A+ |
A-1 |
A+ |
F1 |
A(high) |
R-1L |
Upper medium
grade |
A2 |
A |
A |
A |
A3 |
P-2 |
A- |
A-2 |
A- |
F2 |
A(low) |
Baa1 |
BBB+ |
BBB+ |
BBB(high) |
R-2H |
Lower medium
grade |
Baa2 |
P-3 |
BBB |
A-3 |
BBB |
F3 |
BBB |
R-2M |
Baa3 |
BBB- |
BBB- |
BBB(low) |
R-2L, R-3 |
Ba1 |
Not prime |
BB+ |
B |
BB+ |
B |
BB(high) |
R-4 |
Non-investment
grade
speculative |
Ba2 |
BB |
BB |
BB |
Ba3 |
BB- |
BB- |
BB(low) |
B1 |
B+ |
B+ |
B(high) |
Highly
speculative |
B2 |
B |
B |
B |
R-5 |
B3 |
B- |
B- |
B(low) |
Caa1 |
CCC+ |
C |
CCC |
C |
CCC(high) |
Substantial
risks |
Caa2 |
CCC |
CCC |
Caa3 |
CCC- |
CCC(low) |
Ca |
CC |
CC(high) |
Extremely
speculative |
CC |
CC(low) |
C |
C(high) |
C |
C(low) |
C |
D |
/ |
DDD |
/ |
D |
D |
In default |
DD |
D |
Ratings — in the case of Moody's (the largest and oldest
rating agency) — are based on models and the judgement of the
rating committee. For example, in the case of ratings by Moody's
of Mortgage-backed Securities, models "incorporated firm- and
security-specific factors, market factors, regulatory and legal
factors, and macroeconomic trends."[14]
At least in the US, rating agencies are not liable for
misstatements in securities registration as courts have ruled
ratings are opinions protected by the First Amendment. One
rating agency disclaimer reads:
The ratings ... are and must be construed soley as,
statements of opinion and not statements of fact or
recommendations to purchase, sell, or hold any securities[14]
Uses of
ratings
Credit ratings are used by parties looking for measurements
of relative
credit risk —
investors,
issuers,
investment banks,
broker-dealers, and governments. When a rating agency's
ratings are accurate, the range of investment alternatives
grows, leading to a more efficient market, lowering costs for
both
borrowers and
lenders. This in turn increases the total supply of
risk capital in the economy, leading to stronger growth. It
also may open the
capital markets to borrower who might otherwise be shut out
altogether: small governments,
startup companies, hospitals, and universities.
By bond
issuers
Because many investors won't buy an unrated bonds[15]
a significant bond issuance almost always has at least one
rating from a respected CRA — generally two[16]
— to avoid being under-subscribed or being offered a price too
low for the issuer's purposes. Since around the 1970s, the "Big
Three" and most other rating agencies have used the "issuers
pays" business model, where the agency is paid for its rating by
the issuer — not the buyer — of a security and the rating is
made publicly available.
In
structured finance
Credit rating agencies play a key role in
structured financial transactions — a term for
mortgage-backed securities,
special purpose entities (aka off-balance-sheet vehicles),
derivatives, and similar products[17]
— which became a significant part of rating agencies business
leading up to the 2006-2008 "subprime
crisis". In the words of the to the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Report of the National Commission on the Causes of
the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States:
Rating agencies were essential to the smooth functioning
of the mortgage-backed securities market. Issuers needed
them to approve the structure of their deals; banks needed
their ratings to determine the amount of capital to hold;
repo markets needed their ratings to determine loan terms;
some investors could buy only securities with a triple-A
rating; and the rating agencies' judgement was baked into
collateral agreements and other financial contracts.[18]
The agencies gave top ratings on debt pools that "included
$3.2 trillion of loans to homebuyers with bad credit and
undocumented incomes between 2002 and 2007".[19]
In the case of one of the Big Three — Moody's — structured
finance went from from 28% of that company's revenue in 1998 to
almost 50% in 2007, and "accounted for pretty much all of
Moody's growth."[20][21]
Ratings are vital to "private-label"
asset-backed securities (ABS), such as subprime
mortgage-backed securities (MBS), whose "financial
engineering" make them "harder to understand and to price than
individual loans".[22]
These securities pool debt -- consumer credit assets, such as
mortgages, credit card or auto loans -- and then "slice" them
into "tranches" each given a different priority in the debt
repayment stream of income. Tranches are often likened to
buckets capturing cascading water, where the water of monthly or
quarterly repayment flows down to the next bucket (tranche) only
if the one above has been filled with its full share and is
overflowing.[23]
The higher up the bucket in the income stream the higher the
credit ratings and lower its interest payment.
The pooling of debt has the advantage of
diversification (Mortgages from many different areas of the
country in a mortgage-backed security for example are less
affected by a regional housing bust than a regional bank). The
"tranching" has the advantage of offering investors different
levels of risk and return, each to their taste.[24]
Specifically it gives the top buckets — "super senior" tranches
— more credit worthiness than would a conventional unstructured,
untranched bond with the same repayment income stream. This
allowed rating agencies to rate the tranches triple A, making
them eligible for purchase by
pension funds and
money market funds restricted to top rated debt, and for use
by banks wanting to reduce costly capital requirements.[25]
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, the
complexity "transformed" the Big Three credit rating agencies
"into key players in the process, positioned between the issuers
and the investors of securities"[22]
"Participants in the securitization industry realized that
they needed to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell
structured products to investors. Investment banks therefore
paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to obtain the desired
ratings."[26]
According to the CEO of a servicer of the securitization
industry, Jim Callahan of PentAlpha,
“The rating agencies were important tools to do that
because you know the people that we were selling these bonds
to had never really had any history in the mortgage
business. ... They were looking for an independent party to
develop an opinion,”[26]
From 2000 to 2007, Moody's rated nearly 45,000
mortgage-related securities as triple-A. In contrast only six
(private sector) companies in the United States were given that
top rating.[27]
There has been criticism in the wake of large losses in the
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) market that occurred
despite being assigned top ratings by the CRAs. For instance,
losses on $340.7 million worth of CDOs issued by Credit Suisse
Group added up to about $125 million, despite being rated AAA or
Aaa by
Standard & Poor's,
Moody's Investors Service and
Fitch Group[28]
Structured transactions that involve the bundling of hundreds
or thousands of similar (and similarly rated) securities tend to
concentrate similar risk in such a way that even a slight change
on a chance of default can have an enormous effect on the price
of the bundled security. This means that even though a rating
agency could be correct in its opinion that the chance of
default of a structured product is very low, even a slight
change in the market's perception of the risk of that product
can have a disproportionate effect on the product's market
price, with the result that an ostensibly AAA-rated security can
collapse in price even without there being any default (or
significant chance of default). This possibility raises
significant regulatory issues because the use of ratings in
securities and banking regulation (as noted above) assumes that
high ratings correspond with low volatility and high liquidity.
The rating agencies respond that their advice constitutes
only a "point in time" analysis, that they make clear that they
never promise or guarantee a certain rating to a tranche, and
that they also make clear that any change in circumstance
regarding the risk factors of a particular tranche will
invalidate their analysis and result in a different credit
rating. In addition, some CRAs do not rate bond issuances upon
which they have offered such advice.
Rating agencies state that rather than being a considered
judgement of the volatility of a security and the wisdom of
investing in it, their ratings are opinions and because of the
"personhood" of corporations — protected free speech. This
argument has been effective in American courts, and since the
crisis, "41 legal actions targeting S&P have been dropped or
dismissed".[29]
Ratings use by government regulators
According to authors Herwig Langohr, Patricia Langohr, in
recent years, regulators have "woven" credit ratings "into
everything from allowable investment alternatives for many
institutional investors to required capital for most global
banking firms."[30]
For example, under the
Basel II agreement of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banking regulators
can allow banks to use credit ratings from certain approved CRAs
(called "ECAIs", or "External Credit Assessment Institutions")
when calculating their net capital reserve requirements. Higher
rated securities (such as U.S.
government bonds or short-term
commercial paper from very stable companies) judged less
risky and thus requiring less reserves or protection against a "run
on the bank".
The structure of the Basel II agreements meant that CDOs
capital requirement rose 'exponentially'. For example under
Basel II, a AAA rated securitization requires capital
allocation of only 0.6%, a BBB requires 4.8%, a BB requires 34%,
whilst a BB(-) securitization requires a 52% allocation. For a
number of reasons (frequently having to do with inadequate staff
expertise and the costs that risk management programs entail),
many institutional investors relied solely on the ratings
agencies rather than conducting their own analysis of the risks
these instruments posed. (As an example of the complexity
involved in analyzing some CDOs, the Aquarius CDO structure has
51 issues behind the cash CDO component of the structure and
another 129 issues that serve as reference entities for $1.4
billion in CDS contracts for a total of 180. In a sample of just
40 of these, they had on average 6500 loans at origination.
Projecting that number to all 180 issues implies that the
Aquarius CDO has exposure to about 1.2 million loans.)
Pimco founder
William Gross urged investors to ignore rating agency
judgments, describing the agencies as "an idiot savant with a
full command of the mathematics, but no idea of how to apply
them."[31]
Rating agencies bestowed with regulatory power must be vetted
under both Basel II and SEC regulations. The
Basel II guidelines,[32]
state bank regulators should look for "objectivity,"
"independence," "transparency,", etc. in credit ratings/rating
agency they approve. To further define how these terms will be
used in practice, Banking regulators from a number of
jurisdictions like Europe and Pakistan have since issued their
own discussion papers.[33][34]
United States
In the United States, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) modified its
minimum capital requirements in 1975 for
broker-dealers to base their requirements on credit ratings
by a “nationally
recognized statistical rating organization” (NRSRO); which
at the time, was one of the big three — Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch.[35]
Credit ratings also apply to banking regulations in the US
where since 2001, banks have been permitted to hold less capital
for higher-rated securities. (BBB rated securities require five
times as much capital as AAA and AA rated securities, while BB
securities require ten times more capital, etc.)[35]
Credit ratings applied to what investments some investors
could buy.
- The SEC restricts
money market funds to purchasing “securities that have
received credit ratings from any two NRSROs ... in one of
the two highest short-term rating categories or comparable
unrated securities".[36]
- The
US Department of Labor restricts
pension fund investments to securities rated A or
higher.[35]
- the
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 made
credit ratings crucial for the structured finance and the
mortgage market. It permitted federal- and state-chartered
financial institutions to invest in mortgage-related
securities if the securities had high ratings from at least
one rating agency. According to
Lewis Ranieri, “the language of the original bill ...
requires a rating. ... It put them [the rating agencies] in
the business forevermore. It became one of the biggest, if
not the biggest, business.”[37][35]
According to former Moody’s managing director Eric
Kolchinsky, the law meant “the rating agencies were given a
blank check.”[38][35]
- The 2001 "Recourse Rule" of the Federal Reserve directly
linked the rating agencies’ assessment of asset-backed
security tranches to banks' capital reserve requirements —
those requirements being a major cost to banks. For example,
securities rated AAA or AA required one tenth the capital
that anything rated BB required.[39]
- insurance regulators used credit ratings to ascertain
the strength of the reserves held by insurance companies.[citation
needed]
But while sundry regulations required use of NRSRO rating
agencies by many firms and institutions, once approved as a
NRSRO agency by the SEC, the CRA's themselves "faced no further
regulation" from the SEC for more than 30 years — from 1975 to
2006, when the SEC got limited authority to oversee NRSROs in
the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act.[35]
(Originally NRSRO recognition was granted through a "No
Action Letter" sent by the SEC staff. The action not taken being
enforcement action against a regulated entity — such as an
investment bank or broker-dealer — relying on the rating
agency's ratings if the SEC staff researched those ratings and
and found them widely used and considered "reliable and
credible." These "No Action" letters were made public, making
the NRSRO recognition public.[40])
The Credit Rating Agency Reform Act went into effect in the
Summer of 2007 — after withstanding a court challenge from
Standard & Poor's[41]
— and replaced the "No Action Letter" with NRSRO recognition by
the SEC Commission (not SEC staff). The act required NRSROs to
register with, and be regulated by, the SEC, to have policies
preventing misuse of nonpublic information, the disclosure of
conflicts of interest, and prohibitions against "unfair
practices".[42]
Some regulatory power of credit ratings is scheduled to
loosen and regulations on rating agencies tighten following the
passage of 2010
Dodd–Frank law. The law calls for "every federal agency to
review existing regulations that require the use of an
assessment of the credit-worthiness of the security or money
market instrument ... [and] to remove any reference to, or
requirement of reliance on credit ratings; and substitute with a
standard of credit worthiness as the agency shall determine as
appropriate for such regulations."[43]
Criticism
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007–2010, the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Report[44]
called the "failures" of the
Big Three rating agencies "essential cogs in the wheel of
financial destruction."[45]
SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey complained the ratings of the
large rating agencies were "catastrophically misleading" yet the
agencies "enjoyed their most profitable years ever during the
past decade" while doing so.[46]
In their book on the crisis — All the Devils Are Here
— journalists
Bethany McLean, and
Joe Nocera, criticized rating agencies for continuing "to
slap their triple-A [ratings]s on subprime securities even as
the underwriting deteriorated -- and as the housing boom turned
into an outright bubble" in 2005, 2006, 2007. McLean and Nocera
blamed the practice on "an erosion of standards, a willful
suspension of skepticism, a hunger for big fees and market
share, and an inability to stand up to" investment banks issuing
the securities.[4]
The February 5th 2013 issue of
Economist stated "it is beyond argument that ratings
agencies did a horrendous job evaluating mortgage-tied
securities before the financial crisis hit."[47]
More generally, some of the criticisms credit rating agencies
have been subject to include:
Failure to downgrade securities promptly and laxness
Critics have complained that credit rating agencies often
times do not downgrade companies ratings until after or just
before bankruptcy. While agencies have charts and studies
demonstrating that their ratings are accurate a very high
percentage of the time, according to journalists McLean and
Nocera, the rating agencies
missed the near default of New York City, the
bankruptcy of Orange County, and the
Asian and
Russian meltdowns. They failed to catch
Penn Central in the 1970s and
Long-Term Capital Management in the 1990s. They often
downgraded companies just days before bankruptcy -- too late
to help investors. Nor was this anything new: one study
showed that 78% of the municipal bonds rated double A or
triple-A in 1929 defaulted during the Great Depression.
[48]
In the case of
Enron, though its stock had been in "precipitous decline"
since October 2001 and credit rating agencies had been aware of
the company's problems for months, its rating remained at
investment grade until four days before the company went
bankrupt on December 2, 2001.[49]
[50] In the aftermath, "not a single analyst at either
Moody's of S&P lost his job as a result of missing the Enron
fraud". Management remained unchanged and Moody's stock price
underwent no long term damage. McLean, and Nocera quote one
insider as saying `Enron taught them how small the consequences
of a bad reputation were.`[51]
Freddie Mac's preferred stock was awarded the top rating by
Moody's until
Warren Buffett talked about Freddie on
CNBC.
The next day Moody's downgraded Freddie to one tick above
junk bonds.[52]
Some empirical studies have documented that rather than a
downgrade by a CRA leading to lower net worth and higher
interest rates of corporate bonds, yield spreads of corporate
bonds start to expand as credit quality deteriorates but before
a rating downgrade, casting doubt on the informational value of
credit ratings.[53]
This has led to suggestions that, rather than rely on CRA
ratings in financial regulation, financial regulators should
instead require banks, broker-dealers and insurance firms (among
others) to use
credit spreads when calculating the risk in their
portfolio.
Cosy relationships with securities issuers
Originally rating agencies sold their service as a
subscription to bond/debt buyers who wanted to know how safe the
bonds they were considering buying were. In the 1970s first
Fitch and then Moody's and S&P abandoned that model in favor of
charging bond issuers directly. More revenue was earned this way
because many investors wouldn't buy an unrated bond so issuers
wanted to be rated, while subscriptions were "always going to be
optional" for bond buyers because information about ratings
changes from the larger CRAs could spread so quickly (by word of
mouth, email, etc.), . However the new model meant that the
rating agencies "were potentially beholden to the same people
whose bonds they were rating",[15]
possibly opening themselves to undue influence or the
vulnerability of being misled.[54]
In the structured finance boom of the mid-2000, high ratings
of securities were vital because larger group of investors —
money market funds and
pension funds — were forbidden by their bylaws to buy
securities not rated a triple-A.[55]
An incestuous relationship between financial institutions and
the credit agencies developed such that, banks began to leverage
the credit ratings off one another and 'shop' around amongst the
three big credit agencies until they found the best ratings for
their CDOs. Often they would add and remove loans of various
quality until they met the minimum standards for a desired
rating, usually, AAA rating. Often the fees on such ratings were
$300,000–500,000, but ran up to $1 million.[56]
Subpoena emails later revealed issuers openly threatened to take
their business to another rating agency if the agency's ratings
were not high enough.[57]
These triple-A ratings were highly inaccurate and later
downgraded costing investors billions.
Inaccurate ratings of structured products
Credit Rating Agencies have made errors of judgment in rating
structured products, particularly in assigning AAA ratings to
structured debt, which in a large number of cases has
subsequently been downgraded or defaulted. The actual method by
which Moody's rates CDOs has also come under scrutiny. If
default models are biased to include arbitrary default data and
"Ratings Factors are biased low compared to the true level of
expected defaults, the Moody’s [method] will not generate an
appropriate level of average defaults in its default
distribution process. As a result, the perceived default
probability of rated tranches from a high yield CDO will be
incorrectly biased downward, providing a false sense of
confidence to rating agencies and investors."[58]
Little has been done by rating agencies to address these
shortcomings indicating a lack of incentive for quality ratings
of credit in the modern CRA industry. This has led to problems
for several banks whose capital requirements depend on the
rating of the structured assets they hold, as well as large
losses in the banking industry.[59][60][61]
AAA rated mortgage securities trading at only 80 cents on the
dollar, implying a greater than 20% chance of default, and 8.9%
of AAA rated structured CDOs are being considered for downgrade
by Fitch, which expects most to downgrade to an average of BBB
to BB-. These levels of reassessment are surprising for AAA
rated bonds, which have the same rating class as US government
bonds.[62][63]
Most rating agencies do not draw a distinction between AAA on
structured finance and AAA on corporate or government bonds
(though their ratings releases typically describe the type of
security being rated).
Many banks, such as
AIG, made the mistake of not holding enough capital in
reserve in the event of downgrades to their CDO portfolio. The
structure of the Basel II agreements meant that CDOs capital
requirement rose 'exponentially'. This made CDO portfolios
vulnerable to multiple downgrades, essentially precipitating a
large margin call.
Unwillingness to spend on human resources
While Moody's and other credit rating agencies were quite
profitable — Moody's operating margins were consistently over
50%, higher than famously successful Exxon Mobil or Microsoft,
and its stock rose 340% between the time it was spun off into a
public company and February 2007[64]
— its pay was low by Wall Street standards and its employees
complained of overwork.
Journalist
Michael Lewis argues that the low pay of credit rating
agency employees allowed security issuers to game the ratings of
their securities. Lewis quotes one
Goldman Sachs "trader-turned hedge fund manager" telling
him, "guys who can't get a job on Wall Street get a job at
Moody's," as Moody's paid much less. This seemed surprising to
at least one other Wall Street personality because the ratings
produced by analysts at Moody's and other credit raters had
considerably more effect on the markets than those of the higher
paid analysts at investment banks. "Nobody gives a f**k if
Goldman Sachs likes General Electric paper, if Moody's
downgrades GE paper, it is a big deal. So why does the guy at
Moody's [want to work at Goldman Sachs]"? However, this
difference in pay meant that the "smartest" analysts at the
credit rating agencies "leave for Wall Street firms where they
could use their knowledge (of criteria used to rate securities)
to manipulate the companies they used to work for."
Consequently, it was widely known on Wall Street that the "inner
workings" of the rating models used by the credit rating
agencies, while "officially, a secret", "were ripe for
exploitation."[65]
Lack of analysts also affected ratings quality according to
journalists Bethany MacLean and Joe Nocera.
"The analysts in structured finance were working 12 to 15
hours a day. They made a fraction of the pay of even a
junior investment banker. There were far more deals in the
pipeline than they could possibly handle. They were
overwhelmed. Moody's top brass ... wouldn't add staff
because they didn't want to be stuck with the cost of
employees if the revenues slowed down."[66]
Soliciting business by threatening to downgrade
While often accused of being too close to company management
of their existing clients, CRAs have also been accused of
engaging in heavy-handed "blackmail" tactics in order to solicit
business from new clients, and lowering ratings for those firms
. For instance, Moody's published an "unsolicited" rating of
Hannover Re, with a subsequent letter to the insurance firm
indicating that "it looked forward to the day Hannover would be
willing to pay". When Hannover management refused, Moody's
continued to give Hannover Re ratings, which were downgraded
over successive years, all while making payment requests that
the insurer rebuffed. In 2004, Moody's cut Hannover's debt to
junk status, and even though the insurer's other rating agencies
gave it strong marks, shareholders were shocked by the downgrade
and Hannover lost $175 million USD in market capitalization.[67]
Downgrading that leads to a vicious cycle
The lowering of a credit score by a CRA can create a
vicious cycle and
self-fulfilling prophecy, as not only interest rates for
that company would go up, but other contracts with financial
institutions may be affected adversely, causing an increase in
expenses and ensuing decrease in credit worthiness. In some
cases, large loans to companies contain a clause that makes the
loan due in full if the companies' credit rating is lowered
beyond a certain point (usually a "speculative" or "junk
bond" rating). The purpose of these "ratings triggers" is to
ensure that the bank is able to lay claim to a weak company's
assets before the company declares
bankruptcy and a
receiver is appointed to divide up the claims against the
company. The effect of such ratings triggers, however, can be
devastating: under a worst-case scenario, once the company's
debt is downgraded by a CRA, the company's loans become due in
full; since the troubled company likely is incapable of paying
all of these loans in full at once, it is forced into bankruptcy
(a so-called "death
spiral"). These rating triggers were instrumental in the
collapse of
Enron.
Since that time, major agencies have put extra effort into
detecting these triggers and discouraging their use, and the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requires that public
companies in the United States disclose their existence.
Conflict of interest in assigning sovereign ratings
It has also been suggested that the credit agencies are
conflicted in assigning sovereign credit ratings since they have
a political incentive to show they do not need stricter
regulation by being overly critical in their assessment of
governments they regulate.[68]
As part of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress ordered the U.S. SEC to
develop a report, titled "Report on the Role and Function of
Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities
Markets"[69]
detailing how credit ratings are used in U.S. regulation and the
policy issues this use raises. Partly as a result of this
report, in June 2003, the SEC published a "concept release"
called "Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings under the
Federal Securities Laws"[70]
that sought public comment on many of the issues raised in its
report.
Public comments on this concept release have also been
published on the SEC's website.
In December 2004, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
published a Code of Conduct[71]
for CRAs that, among other things, is designed to address the
types of conflicts of interest that CRAs face. All of the major
CRAs have agreed to sign on to this Code of Conduct and it has
been praised by regulators ranging from the European Commission
to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Oligopoly produced by regulation
Agencies are sometimes accused of being
oligopolists,[72]
because barriers to market entry are high and rating agency
business is itself reputation-based (and the finance industry
pays little attention to a rating that is not widely
recognized). In 2003, the US SEC submitted a report to Congress
detailing plans to launch an investigation into the
anti-competitive practices of credit rating agencies and issues
including conflicts of interest.[73]
Of the large agencies, only Moody's is a separate, publicly
held corporation that discloses its financial results without
dilution by non-ratings businesses, and its high profit margins
(which at times have been greater than 50 percent of gross
margin) can be construed as consistent with the type of returns
one might expect in an industry which has high barriers to
entry.[74]
According to professor
Frank Partnoy, the regulation of CRAs by the SEC and
Federal Reserve Bank has eliminated competition between CRAs
and practically forced market participants to use the services
of the three big agencies, Standard and Poor's, Moody's and
Fitch.[46]
SEC Commissioner Kathleen Casey has said that these CRAs have
acted much like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other companies that
dominate the market because of government actions. When the CRAs
gave ratings that were "catastrophically misleading, the large
rating agencies enjoyed their most profitable years ever during
the past decade."[46]
To solve this problem, Ms. Casey (and other such as NYU
professor Lawrence White[75])
have proposed removing the NRSRO rules completely.[46]
Professor Frank Partnoy suggests that the regulators use the
results of the credit risk swap markets rather than the ratings
of NRSROs.[46]
The CRAs have made competing suggestions that would, instead,
add further regulations that would make market entrance even
more expensive than it is now.[75]
Regulatory reliance on credit ratings
Think-tanks such as the World Pensions Council have argued
that European powers such as France and Germany pushed
dogmatically and naively for the adoption of the so-called
“Basel II recommendations”, adopted in 2005, transposed in
European Union law through the
Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), effective since 2008.
In essence, they forced European banks, and, more importantly,
the
European Central Bank itself when gauging the
solvency of financial institutions, to rely more than ever
on standardized assessments of credit risk marketed by two
private US agencies—Moody’s and Standard & Poor's, thus using
public policy and ultimately taxpayers’ money to strengthen
an anti-competitive duopolistic industry.[76]
The Big Three
The three largest credit rating agencies—Standard
& Poor's,
Moody's Investor Service, and
Fitch Ratings—are collectively referred to as the "Big
Three" due to their substantial market share.[77]
According to the most recent
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) report, the
agencies together account for approximately 96% of all credit
ratings.[78]
As of December 2012, S&P is the largest of the three, with 1.2
million outstanding ratings and 1,416 analysts and supervisors.[78][79]
Moody's is the second largest agency, with 1 million outstanding
ratings and 1,252 analysts and supervisors.[78][79]
Fitch is the smallest of the Big Three, with approximately
350,000 outstanding ratings, and is sometimes used as an
alternative to S&P and Moody’s.[78][80]
Fitch's ratings on corporate obligations incorporate a measure
of investor loss in the event of default, but its ratings on
structured, project, and public finance obligations narrowly
measure default risk.[77]
The credit rating industry has always been characterized by
industry concentration. Since the establishment of the first
agency in 1909, there have never been more than four credit
rating agencies with significant market share.[81]
The situation for international financial markets is similar, as
the same three rating agencies have significant share in that
market as well. Why this concentrated market structure has
developed is a matter of theoretical dispute. One widely-cited
opinion is that the Big Three's historical reputation within the
financial industry creates a high barrier of entry for new
entrants.[81]
Following the enactment of the
Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, seven additional
rating agencies have attained recognition from the SEC as
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations
(NRSROs).[82][83]
While these other agencies remain niche players,[84]
some have gained market share following the
2008 financial crisis,[85]
and in October 2012 several announced plans to join together and
create a new organization called the Universal Credit Rating
Group.[86]
Business
models
Credit rating agencies generate revenue from a variety of
activities related to the production and distribution of credit
ratings.[87]
The sources of the revenue are generally the issuer of the
securities or the investor. Most agencies operate under one or a
combination of
business models: the
subscription model and the issuer-pays model.[88]
However, agencies may offer additional services using a
combination of business models.[87][89]
Under the subscription model, the credit rating agency does
not make its ratings freely available to the market, so
investors pay a subscription fee for access to ratings.[88][90]
This revenue provides the main source of agency income, although
agencies may also provide other types of services.[88][91]
Under the issuer-pays model, agencies charge issuers a fee for
providing credit rating assessments.[88]
This revenue stream allows issuer-pays credit rating agencies to
make their ratings freely available to the broader market,
especially via the Internet.[92][93]
The subscription approach was the prevailing business model
until the early 1970s, when
Moody's,
Fitch, and finally
Standard & Poor's adopted the issuer-pays model.[88][90]
Several factors contributed to this transition, including
increased investor demand for credit ratings, and widespread use
of information sharing technology—such as
fax
machines and
photocopiers—which allowed investors to freely share
agencies’ reports and undermined demand for subscriptions.[94]
Today, eight of the nine
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations
(NRSRO) use the issuer-pays model, only
Egan-Jones maintains an investor subscription service.[92]
Smaller, regional credit rating agencies may use either model.
For example, China's oldest rating agency, Chengxin Credit
Management Co., uses the issuer-pays model, while ratings from
the
Beijing-based
Dagong Global Credit Rating are unsolicited.[95][96]
Critics argue that the issuer-pays model creates a potential
conflict of interest because the agencies are paid by the
organizations whose debt they rate.[97]
However, the subscription model is also seen to have
disadvantages, as it restricts the ratings' availability to
paying investors.[92][93]
Issuer-pays CRAs have argued that subscription-models can also
be subject to conflicts of interest due to pressures from
investors with strong preferences on product ratings.[98]
In 2010 Lace Financials, a subscriber-pays agency later acquired
by
Kroll Ratings, was fined by the SEC for violating securities
rules to the benefit of its largest subscriber.[99]
A 2009
World Bank report proposed a "hybrid" approach in which
issuers who pay for ratings are required to seek additional
scores from subscriber-based third parties.[100]
Other proposed alternatives include a "public-sector" model in
which national governments fund the rating costs, and an
"exchange-pays" model, in which stock and bond exchanges pay for
the ratings.[98][101]
Crowd-sourced, collaborative models such as
Wikirating have been suggested as an alternative to both the
subscription and issuer-pays models, although it is a recent
development as of the 2010, and not yet widely used.[102][102][103]
See also
References
-
^ A debt
instrument is any type of documented financial
obligation. A debt instrument makes it possible to
transfer the ownership of debt so it can be traded.
(source:
wisegeek.com)
-
^ For
example, in the US, a state government which shares the
credit responsibility for a Municipal bond issued by a
municipal government entities but under the control of
that state government entity. (source:Campbell
R. Harvey's Hypertextual Finance Glossary)
-
^
a
b
c
d
Alessi, Christopher.
"The Credit Rating Controversy. Campaign 2012".
Council on Foreign Relations.
Retrieved 29 May 2013.
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^
a
b
McLean, Bethany and Joe
Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, the Hidden History
of the Financial Crisis, Portfolio, Penguin, 2010
(p.111)
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^ from the
beginning of the credit crisis to 2009
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^
Barnett-Hart, Anna Katherine.
"The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical
Analysis". March 19, 2009. Harvard Kennedy
School. Retrieved 28
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problems in the CDO market were caused by a combination
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practices, and flawed credit rating procedures."
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^
"Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs". U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission. 25 September 2008.
Retrieved 2009-04-30.
-
^
Murosgroup.com
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^
"List of Credit Rating Companies". Bangladesh
Securities and Exchange Commission. 2 September 2008.
Retrieved 2007-03-12.
-
^
Crisl History
-
^ Cantor,
R., Hamilton, D.T., Kim, F., and Ou, S., 2007 Corporate
default and recovery rates. 1920-2006, Special
Comment: Moody's investor Service, June Report
102071, 1-48 page 24
-
^ cited by
authors Herwig Langohr and Patricia Langohr
-
^
Langohr, Herwig; Patricia
Langohr (2010).
The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What
They Are, How They Work. Wiley. p. 48.
-
^
a
b
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of
the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,
p.120
-
^
a
b
McLean, and Nocera. All
the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.112)
-
^
Maclean, Bethany; Joe Nocera
(2010). All the Devils Are Here, the Hidden History
of the Financial Crisis'. Portfolio, Penguin,.
p. 117. "Investors like having two agencies rate a deal,
but nobody cared about having all three involved ..."
-
^ MacLean
and Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, p.111
-
^
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of
the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,
p.118
-
^
Smith, Elliot Blair
(September 24, 2008).
"Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime
Scourge". Blooomberg.
-
^ McLean,
and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.124)
-
^ see also:Final
Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,
p.118, quote: the rating of structured finance products
... made up close to half of Moody's rating revenues in
2005, 2006, 2007.
-
^
a
b
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic
Crisis in the United States. 2011. pp. 43–44.
"Purchasers of the safer tranches got a higher rate of
return than ultra-safe Treasury notes without much extra
risk—at least in theory. However, the financial
engineering behind these investments made them harder to
understand and to price than individual loans. To
determine likely returns, investors had to calculate the
statistical probabilities that certain kinds of
mortgages might default, and to estimate the revenues
that would be lost because of those defaults. Then
investors had to determine the effect of the losses on
the payments to different tranches. This complexity
transformed the three leading credit rating
agencies—Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and
Fitch—into key players in the process, positioned
between the issuers and the investors of securities."
-
^
Here's how a CDO works| Upstart Business Journal|
December 5, 2007
-
^ Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report, p.43
-
^ MacLean,
and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.111)
-
^
a
b
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic
Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. 44. "Participants
in the securitization industry realized that they needed
to secure favorable credit ratings in order to sell
structured products to investors. Investment banks
therefore paid handsome fees to the rating agencies to
obtain the desired ratings. “The rating agencies were
important tools to do that because you know the people
that we were selling these bonds to had never really had
any history in the mortgage business. ... They were
looking for an independent party to develop an opinion,”
Jim Callahan told the FCIC; Callahan is CEO of
PentAlpha, which services the securitization industry,
and years ago he worked on some of the earliest
securitizations"
-
^
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report. National
Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic
Crisis in the United States. 2011. p. xxv.
-
^
Tomlinson, Richard; Evans,
David (1 June 2007).
"CDOs mask huge subprime losses, abetted by credit
rating agencies". International Herald Tribune.
-
^
"Free speech or knowing misrepresentation?". The
Economist. 5 February 2013,.
-
^
The Rating Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They
Are, How They Work ... By Herwig Langohr,
Patricia Langohr, Wiley, 2008, p.ix
-
^
"Buffett and the Ratings Cartel". The Wall Street
Journal. 2 June 2010.
Retrieved 21 June 2010.
-
^
"Part 2: The First Pillar—Minimum Capital Requirements"
(pdf). Basel II: International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework.
Bank for International Settlements. November 2005.
Retrieved April 18, 2013.
-
^
Consultation Paper on the recognition of External Credit
Assessment Institutions| The Committee of European
Banking Supervisors Discussion Paper| Web.archive.org
-
^
Eligibility Criteria for recognition of External Credit
Assessment Institutions| State Bank of Pakistan ECAI
Criteria, SBP.org.pk
-
^
a
b
c
d
e
f
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of
the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,
p.119
-
^ Andrew J.
Donohue, director, Division of Investment Management,
SEC, “Speech by SEC Staff: Opening Remarks before the
Commission Open Meeting,” Washington, DC, June 25, 2008.
See also Lawrence J. White, “Markets: The Credit Rating
Agencies,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 2
(Spring 2010): 214.
-
^ Lewis
Ranieri, interview by FCIC, July 30, 2010
-
^ Eric
Kolchinsky, testimony before the FCIC, Hearing on the
Credibility of Credit Ratings, the Investment Decisions
Made Based on Those Ratings, and the Financial Crisis,
session 1: The Ratings Process, June 2, 2010,
transcript, pp. 19–20
-
^
Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of
the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States,
p.100
-
^
Definition of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating
Organization| ACTION: Proposed rule. SEC
-
^
Leone, Marie (2 October
2006).
"Bush Signs Rating Agency Reform Act".
CFO (Magazine).
Retrieved 9 May 2009.
-
^
Jonathan S. Sack and
Stephen M. Juris (2007).
"Rating Agencies: Civil Liability Past and Future"
(PDF). New York Law Journal 238 (88).
Retrieved 9 May 2009.
-
^
Credit Rating Agencies| SEC spotlight
-
^ the
ten-member commission appointed by the United States
government with the goal of investigating the causes of
the financial crisis of 2007–2010
-
^
CONCLUSIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION
-
^
a
b
c
d
e
A Triple-A Idea—Ending the rating oligopoly, Wall
Street Journal, April 15, 2009
-
^
TE (5 February 2013).
"Free speech or knowing misrepresentation?". The
Economist.
-
^ McLean,
and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010
(p.113-4)
-
^
Borrus, Amy (8 April 2002).
"The Credit-Raters: How They Work and How They Might
Work Better". BusinessWeek.
-
^
Wyatt, Edward (8 February
2002).
"Credit Agencies Waited Months to Voice Doubt About
Enron" (–
Scholar search).[dead
link]
-
^ McLean,
and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.120)
-
^
Associated Press (August 22,
2008).
"Freddie Mac courts investors, Buffett passes".
International Herald Tribune via Internet Archive.
Retrieved August 6, 2011.
-
^ See,
variously, Kliger, D. and O. Sarig (2000), The
Information Value of Bond Ratings, Journal of
Finance, December: 2879-2902 and Galil, Koresh (2003).
The quality of corporate credit rating: An empirical
investigation. EFMA 2003 Helsinki Meetings. European
Financial Management Association.
-
^
Partnoy, Frank (2006). "How
and why credit rating agencies are not like other
gatekeepers". In R. E. Litan & Y. Fuchita. Financial
gatekeepers: Can they protect investors?.
Brookings Institution. p. 13.
SSRN 900257.
-
^ McLean,
and Nocera. All the Devils Are Here, 2010 (p.111)
-
^
Wayne, Leslie (15 July
2009).
"Calpers Sues Over Ratings of Securities". The
New York Times.
-
^
Nocera; McLean (2010).
All the Devils Are Here. Penguin,. "[Example from
page 118] "UBS banker Rovert Morelli, upon hearing that
S&P might be revising its RMSBS ratings, sent an e-mail
to an S&P analyst. `Heard your ratings could be 5
notches back of moddys [sic] equivalent, Gonna kill you
resi biz. May force us to do moddyfitch only ...`""
-
^
Wadden IV, William "Biv"
(2002).
"Interpreting Moody’s Historical Default Rate Data".
-
^
Norris, Floyd (2 November
2007).
"Being Kept in the Dark on Wall Street". The New
York Times.
Retrieved 30 April 2010.
-
^
Buiter, Willem (21 September
2007).
"Basel II: back to the drawing board?". The
Financial Times.
-
^
Kerr, Duncan (15 October
2007).
"Banks learn to reprice risk in post-crisis credit
market". Financial News (eFinancialNews
Limited). Retrieved
29 June 2012.
-
^
"Fitch Completes Review of All Fitch-Rated SF CDOs;
Places $36.8B on Rating Watch Negative". Fitch
Ratings. Retrieved 10
May 2009.
-
^
"Credit markets | CDOh no! | Economist.com".
Economist.com<!. 8 November 2007.
Retrieved 10 May 2009.
-
^ MacLean,
Bethany and Joe Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, the
Hidden History of the Financial Crisis Portfolio,
Penguin, 2010 (p.124)
-
^ Michael
Lewis The Big Short : Inside the Doomsday Machine
WW Norton and Co, 2010, (p.156)
-
^ MacLean,
Bethany and Joe Nocera, All the Devils Are Here, the
Hidden History of the Financial Crisis Portfolio,
Penguin, 2010 (p.123)
-
^
Klein, Alec (24 November
2004).
"Credit Raters' Power Leads to Abuses, Some Borrowers
Say". The Washington Post.
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^
"Will Financial Reform Negatively Bias U.S. Sovereign
Credit Ratings?". Thoughtsworththinking.net.
May 21, 2010.
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^
SEC.gov
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^
SEC.gov
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^
IOSCO.org
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^
"Measuring the measurers". The Economist. 31
May 2007.
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^
Teather, David (28 January
2003).
"SEC seeks rating sector clean-up | Business".
London: The Guardian.
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^
« Dagong, the new Chinese bad guy or a fair player ? »,
SACR, 21 mars 2012.
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^
a
b
AAA Oligopoly, The Wall Street Journal,
FEBRUARY 26, 2008
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^ M. Nicolas
J. Firzli, "A Critique of the Basel Committee on Banking
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^
a
b
H. Kent Baker; Gerald S. Martin (2011).
"Capital Structure and Corporate Financing Decisions:
Theory, Evidence, and Practice". Wiley.
ISBN 0470569522.
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^
a
b
c
d
"Annual Report on Nationally Recognized Statistical
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^
a
b
Jeannette Neumann (16 November 2012).
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oversight". Financial News.
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^
Klein, Alec (23 November
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"Smoothing the Way for Debt Markets". The
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^
a
b
Gerard Caprio (2012).
"Handbook of Key Global Financial Markets, Institutions,
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^
Marie Leone (2 October 2006).
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^
"Credit Rating Agencies—NRSROs". U.S. Securities and
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^
Arturo Cifuentes (4 March
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^
Yali N'diaye (26 February
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^
Simon Rabinovitch (24
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^
a
b
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pp. 60–61.
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^
a
b
c
d
e
Gerard Caprio (2012).
Handbook of Key Global Financial Markets,
Institutions, and Infrastructure. Academic
Press.
ISBN 0123978734.
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^
Lianna Brinded (38 November
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"Moody's to boost investor confidence with new data
feed". Financial News.
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^
a
b
Pragyan Deb; Gareth Murphy (2009).
"Credit Rating Agencies: An Alternative Model"
(PDF). London School of Economics.
-
^
"General Principles for Credit Reporting" (PDF).
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rating agencies are starting to provide other types of
services, including credit reporting services."
-
^
a
b
c
Stephen Foley (14 January 2013).
"Issuer payment: model resistant to reform".
Financial Times.
-
^
a
b
"Issuer-pays model ensures ratings are available to the
entire market". The Economic Times. 6 May
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^
John (Xuefeng) Jiang; Mary
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^
Katie Hunt (31 October 2012).
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Norbert Gaillard (2011).
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^
Gwynneth Anderson (April
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^
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^
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^
Jonathan Katz; Emanuel
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"Credit Rating Agencies: No Easy Regulatory Solutions"
(pdf). The World Bank Group.
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"Report of the Committee on Comprehensive Regulation for
Credit Rating Agencies" (pdf). Securities and
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Registration". MNI. Deutsche Boerse Group.
Further
reading
- On the history and origins of credit agencies, see
Born Losers: A History of Failure in America, by Scott
A. Sandage (Harvard University Press, 2005), chapters 4–6.
- On contemporary dynamics, see Timothy J. Sinclair,
The New Masters of Capital: American Bond Rating Agencies
and the Politics of Creditworthiness (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005).
- For a description of what CRAs do in the corporate
context, see
IOSCO Report on the Activities of Credit Rating Agencies
and
IOSCO Statement of Principles Regarding the Activities of
Credit Rating Agencies.
- On the limits of the current 'Issuer-pays' business
model, see Kenneth C. Kettering, Securization and its
discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development,
29 CDZLR 1553, 60 (2008).
- For a renewed approach of CRAs business model, see
Vincent Fabié, A Rescue Plan for rating Agencies, Blue
Sky—New Ideas for the Obama Administration
ideas.berkeleylawblogs.org.
-
Frank J. Fabozzi and Dennis Vink (2009). "On securitization
and over-reliance on credit ratings". Yale International
Center for Finance.
- For a theoretical analysis of the impact of regulation
on rating agencies' business model, see
Rating Agencies in the Face of Regulation—Rating Inflation
and Regulatory Arbitrage, by Opp, Christian C., Opp, Marcus
M. and Harris, Milton (2010).
- Analysts and ratings = chapter 14 in Stocks and
Exchange – the only Book you need , Ladis Konecny ,
2013,
ISBN 9783848220656
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DA ITALIANO A INGLESE
Impostare INGLESE anziché italiano e
ripetere la procedura descritta.
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